Metajustification

—-
Metajustification
— the rest seems to consist mainly in working out when disputes arise from operating within different evaluative frameworks or people grinding through the nitty gritty of applying those frameworks to philosophical (that is not to say that these are inconsequential tasks of course!)
it would be interesting to explore whether or not this is the _only_ way one may justify and stop the regress to the next level of "meta"
— indeed, even if one holds that perhaps one or more extra levels of meta are needed, as long as the final level displays the appropriate "downward" justificatory trajectory, the infinite regress is averted
— it would also be interesting to explore why one would wish to postulate more than two levels on which philosophy (or any other human (?) action) takes place
— an intial thought in response to this: perhaps if one wished to advocate some sort of pluralism of normative frameworks, then one would need another "upper" in which to situate this view normatively also?
— initially it seems that at least these two levels are both needed: there has to be something "downward" to assess consequences with respect to and there has to be something "upward" to give normative value (in some sense) to the lower layer
— indeed, that question itself seems to presuppose some other normative framework in which the metacontent can be viewed as descriptive and thus assessed
— to put it in a sort of intuitionistic way: that consequentialism (in some form) is a kind of base reasoning that we then constructively build from

—-

Chris Wilcox

—-

[[red There's a very similar issue in philosophy of statistics. But it can't be resolved downwards using consequentialism! Because one of the two base-level positions I'm interested in evaluating is consistent with consequentialism and the other one isn't, so to assume consequestianlism would be unfair. Or at least would short-circuit the discussion.
Jason ]]

—-

See also Metaljustification