The Problem Of Induction 2
I've been doing some reading on:

(i) Hume's problem of induction
(ii) Goodman's new riddle of induction

And have been thinking about their relevance to the study of consciousness.

Hume's problem of induction, i.e. that one cannot justify inductive knowledge either deductively or inductively, is summarised quite clearly in Hume's 'Inference from the impression to the idea'. Goodman also provides a clear outline of his new riddle of induction in 'Fact, fiction and forecast' (chapter 3).

Relevance to the study of consciousness:

My goodness. It seems to me that consciousness is the only thing that's actually observable. Maybe you mean other people's consciousness? I think you'd like "The View From Nowhere" by Nagel on this topic (especially if you liked "What is it like to be a bat?").

But I think the main point I wanted to get across, is that Hume and Goodman's problems of induction demonstrate that all theories of consciousness are merely theories - none can be established in certain terms. Fundamentally, it doesn't seem possible to know whether we can trust in a particular theory.